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ABSTRACT
It is widely recognized that it is the language of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, not the outcome, that is legally most salient.  Yet the 
language of opinions has seen little research.  Linguistic analysis 
programs are now commonly used in other disciplines to compare 
language choices.  We apply the leading program to evaluate 
Roberts Court opinions.  We find significant differences, depending 
on whether the opinion is for the majority or separate, revealing the 
significance of compromise at the Court.  In addition, we find some 
differences in language content, depending upon who authored the 
opinion.
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INTRODUCTION
Linguistic analysis was notably used during World War II as 
the United States analyzed the content of German newspapers for 
assessment of the impact of the war on that nation.1 The practice is 
now widely used in academic research. Political scientists and others 
have used the technique extensively to analyze the speech of 
candidates.2 Business researchers have found the technique a reliable 
predictor of corporate reputation3 and the effect of press releases on 
markets.4 Sociologists have used the tool to study marriages5 and the 
formation of relationships.6 The technique has been used very 
extensively in psychology.7 Such computerized text analysis has 
been growing across fields of research to analyze the significance of 
choice of words.8 It is time for the law to take greater advantage of 
the resource as well.
1. Mary C. Lacity & Marius A. Janson, Understanding Qualitative Data: 
A Framework of Text Analysis Methods, 11 J. MGMT. INFO. SYSTEMS 137, 143 
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Richard B. Slatcher et al., Winning Words: Individual 
Differences in Linguistic Style Among U.S. Presidential and Vice Presidential 
Candidates, 41 J. RES. PERSONALITY 63 (2007) (analyzing language of debates press 
conferences and interviews of 2004 candidates and finding material differences).
3. John Geppert & Janice E. Lawrence, Predicting Firm Reputation 
Through Content Analysis of Shareholders’ Letter, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 285 
(2008).
4. Elaine Henry, Market Reaction to Verbal Components of Earnings 
Press Releases: Event Study Using a Predictive Algorithm, 3 J. EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES ACCT. 1 (2006); Elaine Henry, Are Investors Influenced by How 
Earnings Press Releases Are Written?, 45 J. BUS. COMM. 363 (2008). 
5. Rachel A. Simmons, Peter C. Gordon & Dianne L. Chambless, 
Pronouns in Marital Interaction: What Do “You” and “I” Say About Marital 
Health?, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 932 (2005).
6. Molly E. Ireland et al., Language Style Matching Predicts Relationship 
Initiation and Stability, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 39, 39 (2011).
7. See, e.g., Richard Clément, Social Psychology and Intergroup 
Communication, 15 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 222, 222 (1996); Simone
Freitag, Anna Grimm & Silke Schmidt, Talking About Traumatic Events: A Cross-
Cultural Investigation, 7 EUROPE’S J. PSYCHOL. 40, 40-41 (2011); Thomas 
Holtgraves, Social Psychology and Language: Words, Utterances, and 
Conversations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1386, 1386 (Susan T. Fiske, 
Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010); James W. Pennebaker, 
Tracy J. Mayne & Martha E. Francis, Linguistic Predictors of Adaptive 
Bereavement, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 863, 863 (1997).
8. See Shuki J. Cohen, Construction and Preliminary Validation of a 
Dictionary for Cognitive Rigidity: Linguistic Markers of Overconfidence and 
Overgeneralization and Their Concomitant Psychological Distress, 41 J.
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This Article embarks upon such a linguistic analysis of 
opinions rendered in the Roberts Court era. We consider the different 
languages used in different types of opinions: majority, concurrence, 
or dissent. We also use our content analysis to evaluate differences in 
language depending upon who authored the opinion.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OPINIONS
Judicial decisions have seen considerable research from social 
scientists. However, this research generally considers only the case 
outcome. The typical pattern of such research is to determine 
whether the outcome of the case is liberal or conservative and then 
try to ascertain what factors are associated with the outcome.9 In this 
process, all liberal or conservative opinions are treated as equals. 
There is now considerable evidence of the significance of ideology 
on judicial decisions, but there is little evidence of how ideology 
influences the characteristics of opinions and the governing doctrine 
that they create. Yet the content of the opinion “is significantly more 
important, particularly in the long run, than the ruling between the 
parties in the case.”10 Pioneers in the study of ideological decision 
making have recognized that it is not the decision but the opinion of 
the Court that “is the core of the policy-making power.”11
More recent and sophisticated research has addressed the 
content of opinions in their use of citations or the length of Supreme 
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 347, 350-51 (2012) (discussing such increased usage and 
citing numerous articles using the analysis).
9. The classical research in this regard is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). The work was 
extremely popular and has been updated. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter 
SEGAL & SPAETH REVISITED]. The authors predicted three-fourths of justices vote 
based only on ideology. Evidence of the significance of ideology on judicial 
decisions “has accumulated steadily over the years.” Stefanie A. Lindquist & David 
E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 136 (2006).
10. YONATAN LUPU & JAMES H. FOWLER, THE STRATEGIC CONTENT MODEL 
OF SUPREME COURT OPINION WRITING 4 (2010), available at 
http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/strategic_content_model.pdf. “[A] judge may sometimes be 
willing to reach a less-preferred result in a particular case . . . in order to establish or 
entrench a doctrine or principle that the judge favors or to modify one that the judge 
dislikes.” Matthew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
191, 206 (2009).
11. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING 172 (1976).
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Court opinions.12 The pattern of Supreme Court citations has been 
studied by examining whether their treatment was positive or 
negative.13 Hansford and Spriggs found feedback loops to citation 
practice.14 Once a case was cited more often with a positive 
treatment, it gained what the authors called vitality, which caused it 
to be cited still more frequently in future cases.15 Citations were 
conditioned somewhat on the ideological preferences of the justices, 
but their legal vitality also mattered. Network analysis has also been 
used to study the pattern of citations.
Despite these advances, the actual language of opinions has 
been little examined. Citations are clearly significant to the law, but 
they can often be readily manipulated.16 Ultimately, it is the language 
of the Court that is used as a precedent for future decisions. “Thus, 
the words used . . . by the Court [] are important to understand.”17
This language may be quoted directly as the key to resolving a future 
decision.
Legal researchers, by contrast, closely scrutinize details of 
judicial opinions. However, their analyses typically dwell on 
intricate details of particular cases, with little generalization of the 
meaning of opinion language. Nor do these legal studies use more 
12. The study of citations was emphasized in William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON.
249, 275 (1976). Various subsequent studies examined the pattern of case citation on 
the Court. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An 
Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 539 (2010) 
(assessing the factors associated with case citation); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of 
the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997) (finding 
citations to be influenced by both politics and law). For a study on the length of 
Supreme Court opinions, see Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621 
(2008).
13. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 2 (2006).
14. See id. at 24-25.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Rather than displaying the significance of a precedent for a decision, the 
citation of a precedent may merely be a post hoc rationalization. Citations may be 
merely “a mask hiding other considerations.” Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis 
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 743 (1988). Judge Wald 
observed that justices may ignore the precedents they disfavor and “follow those 
precedents which they like best.” Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of 
Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 481 (1986).
17. PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 3 (2010).
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rigorous, statistical methods in order to find true associations. In 
general, the content of opinions has been “woefully understudied.”18
Yet legal opinions and their language lie at the heart of what 
the law is. A conservative opinion may contain liberal precedential 
language, or vice versa, so outcome coding may be misleading.19 An 
opinion, regardless of its ideology, may contain strong language of 
great precedential effect or limiting language, confining the case 
largely to its facts.20 The influence of an opinion, on society and 
future courts, is largely determined by its language because that is 
what an opinion is. The political scientists’ focus on outcomes has 
been said to stunt “the growth of empirical legal inquiry.”21
An opinion may create a flexible standard for resolution of 
future cases or a bright line rule.22 It may create an exception to an 
existing bright line rule. An opinion may call for a higher or lower 
18. Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 517, 517 (2006); see also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, 
Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting 
Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1908-09 (2009) (noting that separate 
opinions reaching the same outcome may be very different in expressing the law in 
their text); Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. POL. 261, 266 (2006) 
(considering decisions on affirmative action and concluding that “looking to 
outcomes rather than opinions leads to the wrong conclusion of what the court 
‘did’”); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1989, 1990 (1996) (urging the need for a theory of how opinions create 
governing doctrine).
19. See Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and 
Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 696 (2012) (showing how opinions that were 
categorized as liberal or conservative were quite different in the ideological impact, 
as cited in future opinions).
20. Bush v. Gore, for example, was resolved with an opinion in which the 
Court tried to suggest that it was a single-ticket decision “good for this day and train 
only.” Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual 
History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 123 (2001).
21. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: 
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 862 (2010); see 
also Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial 
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1533 (2009) (stressing the need to study 
“aspects of the opinions accompanying the votes”). “The influence of a 
precedent . . . depends on the language of the opinion.” Cross, supra note 19, at 738.
22. The differences between legal rules and standards have been analyzed 
in depth. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); 
Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1287, 1295-96 (2006); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
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level of scrutiny in different types of cases. Opinions may be broad-
based or “minimalist” in nature.23 At the Supreme Court level, such 
differences may be exceedingly important because the Court’s 
position will control all future lower court opinions in like cases.
The “construction” of an opinion is said to be “the core of 
appellate judging.”24 “[W]hat judges say is even more important than 
how they vote.”25 A case’s legal reasoning “can have more far-
reaching consequences [than the outcome] by altering the existing 
state of legal policy and thus helping to structure the outcomes of 
future disputes.”26 Richard Posner contends that “precedent projects 
a judge’s influence more effectively than a decision” itself.27 Even 
the leading researchers on ideological voting have conceded that it is 
the content of the opinion that “constitutes the core of the Court’s 
policy-making process.”28 Consequently, it is important to examine 
the language of Supreme Court decisions and not just the ideological 
direction of their results.
Some opinions will be more powerfully written and influential. 
Walter Murphy maintains that a judge’s ability “to reason with taut 
logic” and “to use persuasive rhetoric” would make other judges 
more willing to accept the opinion’s conclusions.29 Surely the quality 
of reasoning is a relevant factor in a Supreme Court opinion’s power. 
Other rhetorical features may also be significant.
Erwin Chemerinsky suggests that existing research has 
overlooked “a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their 
rhetoric.”30 Considering this rhetoric “can help us to understand and 
23. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (First Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 
2001) (setting out the theory and support for a minimalist approach to Supreme 
Court decision making).
24. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 171 
(1994).
25. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 98 (2002).
26. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 13, at 2-3.
27. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (4th ed. 1992).
28. SEGAL & SPAETH REVISITED, supra note 9, at 357.
29. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 98 (1964); see 
also Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 10-11 (1966) 
(suggesting that “an opinion which does not within its own confines exhibit an 
awareness of relevant considerations, whose premises are concealed, or whose logic 
is faulty is not likely to enjoy either a long life or the capacity to generate 
offspring”).
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2008, 2008 (2002).
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appraise the Supreme Court’s work.”31 His impression is that the 
Court has become “less eloquent and more sarcastic” than in the 
past.32 Eloquence is not readily amenable to measurement, though.
It is quite difficult to measure opinion language because of 
difficulties associated with quantifying measures of the law created.33
Studies of particular, significant Supreme Court doctrines have 
shown that they have a significant influence on future decisions,34
but this research is hard to generalize to the full corpus of the Court’s 
rulings.
The proper style of a judicial opinion has been debated. There 
is a handbook to guide judges in how to best draft opinions.35 It 
emphasizes that word choice is especially important “to the judicial 
writer.”36 Certain styles are to be avoided in the judicial opinion, 
such as anger and provocation.37 Some of these attributes may be 
measured, as we demonstrate below, which permits an assessment of 
opinions and their authors.38
While judges typically emphasize factors such as the use and 
analysis of precedent,39 writing style itself can be important. William 
Domnarski suggests that judicial opinions are “a form of legal 
literature” to communicate from a court to society.40 Judge Posner 
suggested the importance of “the specific written form in which a 
writer encodes an idea” as including “vocabulary and grammar but 
also the often tacit principles governing the length and complexity of 
sentences, the organization of sentences into larger units such as 
paragraphs, and the level of formality at which to pitch the 
31. Id. at 2010.
32. Id. at 2021.
33. JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK (5th ed. 
2007).
34. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, The Influence of Law in the 
Supreme Court’s Search-and-Seizure Jurisprudence, 33 AM. POL. RES. 33, 35, 52 
(2005); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 315 (2002). These studies show 
that the creation of a particular legal rule can shape the outcome of future decisions.
35. GEORGE, supra note 33.
36. Id. at 405.
37. Id. at 449.
38. See infra Section II.B.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
40. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 2 (1996); see also
Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 930 
(1961) (claiming that “[t]he problem of composing good judicial writing cannot 
finally be so very different from the problem of composing any kind of good 
writing”).
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writing.”41 Robert Leflar has urged that literary style is central to the 
quality of opinions.42
James Boyd White says that an opinion is essentially 
transmitting the message: “This is the right way to think and talk 
about this case, and others like it.”43 As such, opinion language is 
vital to the functioning of precedent. Judge Aldisert has declared that 
opinions are “performative utterance[s]” that set out what the law 
should be.44 He stresses that word choice may have “special [legal] 
significance.”45
Although Supreme Court opinions commonly contain many 
words, each one may be significant and agonized over by the 
justices. Justice Scalia has characterized himself as a “nitpicker[]” 
and emphasized the need to use “a word precisely the way it should 
be used.”46 The Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook observes that a 
judge “can make subtle distinctions between ideas by changing a 
single word.”47
Moreover, the precise substantive content of opinion language 
is not all that is important. Judge Posner declared “that style is 
organic to judicial writing.”48 A justice’s individual writing style 
“determines how effectively the substantive content of opinions is 
conveyed.”49 Former Attorney General Griffin Bell stressed that 
“[t]he style of an opinion may affect the manner in which it is 
interpreted by the reader.”50 Justice Cardozo declared that “[f]orm is 
41. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (1995).
42. Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 810, 816 (1961).
43. James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion for?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 
1366 (1995).
44. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 13 (2d ed. 2009) (internal 
quotation omitted). A performative utterance is wording that “is neither true nor 
false but its purpose is to make a part of the world conform to what is said.” 
CHARLES W. KREIDLER, INTRODUCING ENGLISH SEMANTICS 186 (1998).
45. ALDISERT, supra note 44, at 226.
46. Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court 
Justices: Justice Antonin Scalia, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51, 61 (2010).
47. GEORGE, supra note 33, at 405.
48. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD 
RELATION 298 (1988); see also DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 1 (considering “style 
in judicial opinions and argu[ing] that it matters”).
49. Leflar, supra note 42, at 816.
50. Griffin B. Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 15 J. PUB. L. 214, 214 (1966). 
He further declared that style was “an important factor in the growth of the law,” 
affecting how an opinion will be interpreted. Id.
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not something added to substance as a mere protuberant adornment,” 
but that “[t]he two are fused into a unity.”51 Language does not 
simply describe reality; “reality emerges through language.”52
Language choices are therefore central to the content and 
significance of Supreme Court opinions.
A key function of style is to make an opinion more persuasive 
and ultimately more effective as a precedent. Judge Posner has 
emphasized this fact with an illustration, writing:
One judicial opinion might be better than another not because the 
argument was more persuasive but because by candidly disclosing the 
facts and authorities tugging against its result, by being tentative and 
concessive in tone, even by confessing doubt about the soundness of its 
result, it was a more credible, a more impressive judicial document . . . .53
He further noted that some styles are “unlikely to hold much current 
interest,” while a more “vivid” and “memorable opinion . . . can be 
pulled out and made to exemplify law’s abiding concerns.”54 “A 
good style . . . powerfully improves substance.”55 A review of 
nineteenth-century opinions found “a connection between a Justice’s 
effective writing style and his contribution to constitutional 
jurisprudence.”56 Thus, better written opinions are likely to be more 
powerful. The nature of this association is quite ambiguous, though, 
as there is no clear standard for a “better” opinion and no obvious 
way to test for opinion quality. Nevertheless, such study should be 
considered.
Despite the importance of opinions and their language, the 
matter has been little studied. One evaluation of circuit court 
opinions in administrative law examines the degree to which opinion 
language could affect the transmission and use of precedents.57 The 
author theorized that intercircuit citations could be a guide to the 
51. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 5 (1931). Cardozo’s opinions reportedly “had ‘a liquid style that 
sparkles.’” Anon Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L.
REV. 625, 625 (1943).
52. Lacity & Janson, supra note 1, at 139.
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 256 (rev. & enlarged ed. 
1998).
54. Id. at 257-58.
55. GEORGE, supra note 33, at 385.
56. DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 61.
57. Robert J. Hume, The Impact of Judicial Opinion Language on the 
Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 127 
(2009).
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persuasiveness of opinion language.58 The measures available for this 
study, though, were quite crude. The research considered some 
substantive legal variables, but the only true opinion characteristic 
examined was the number of block quotations used.59 This variable 
was indeed a significant determinant of future citation.60 The study 
showed the influence of this measure, but it was a very remote metric 
for opinion content. This study remains a lonely example of research 
into opinion content.
Measuring the meaning of judicial opinions is a daunting task. 
No one has yet created a tool for measuring something so simple as 
whether the opinion created a rule or a standard. There seem to be no 
theoretical tools for evaluating opinion content or quality expounded 
by legal scholars that could be readily operationalized for study. 
However, the linguistic analysis tools used in other disciplines can be
brought to bear for judicial opinions. This is the purpose of this 
study; the following Part summarizes the value of such linguistic 
analysis.
II. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Legal scholars have argued for the application of linguistic 
analysis to legal opinions.61 Yet, surprisingly, little of this research 
has been done.62 While a number of legal articles have been 
published using a broad definition of content analysis, they have not 
approached the sophistication of research in other areas.63 We begin 
to apply these more sophisticated techniques to opinion content.
58. Id. at 129.
59. Id. at 142.
60. Id. at 144.
61. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of 
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2008).
62. Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A 
Quantitative Analysis of the “Right to Counsel” Cases, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1
(1957). Some rather informal and limited efforts have been made. One early article 
by a political scientist analyzed relatively few criminal cases to try to predict future 
case outcomes. Id.
63. See Hall & Wright, supra note 61, at 72-73. The authors’ definition of 
content analysis is quite expansive, including coding of case facts. Id. This is a much 
broader scope than the linguistic analysis we discuss.
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A. Judicial Linguistic Analysis Studies
Political scientists have recently begun the true linguistic 
content analysis of opinions. An early study considered the patterns 
of cognitive styles and voting of the justices of the Supreme Court.64
The study evaluated opinions issued between 1946 and 1978.65 The 
authors randomly sampled paragraphs from opinions and coded them 
for integrative complexity, using a subjective assessment.66 Liberals 
during this period wrote more complex opinions in economic and 
civil liberties cases than did conservatives.67 Conservatives preferred 
to reduce cases to “simple” issues, while liberals were more 
pluralistic and accommodating of conflicting concerns—deemed the 
preferable approach.68
One article examines texts written before individuals were 
elevated to the Supreme Court as applied to the decisions they 
subsequently made.69 They found that greater cognitive inconsistency 
(or perhaps flexibility) in the pre-appointment language of the 
justices was associated with greater ideological drift after 
appointment.70 This research showed the value of linguistic analysis, 
but did not actually study opinions.
The same authors have conducted an additional study of 
opinions as well in which they sought to measure the clarity of 
opinions rendered between 1983 and 2007.71 They identified some 
justices as writing especially clear opinions (Scalia and Breyer)72 and 
found that dissents were always clearer than majority opinions.73 The 
larger the majority coalition was, the more complex the resulting 
opinion.74 They also found that a smaller majority produced clearer 
64. Philip E. Tetlock, Jane Bernzweig & Jack L. Gallant, Supreme Court 
Decision Making: Cognitive Style as a Predictor of Ideological Consistency of 
Voting, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1227 (1985).
65. Id. at 1229.
66. Id. at 1230-31.
67. Id. at 1233.
68. Id. at 1235-36.
69. Ryan J. Owens & Justin Wedeking, Predicting Drift on Politically 
Insulated Institutions: A Study of Ideological Drift on the United States Supreme 
Court, 74 J. POL. 487 (2012).
70. Id. at 495.
71. Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: 
Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
1027 (2011).
72. Id. at 1043.
73. Id. at 1046.
74. Id. at 1048.
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opinions, while those that altered precedent were less clear.75
Opinion complexity also varied by issue area, though the relative 
position of the justices remained roughly the same.76 Complexity was 
unrelated to judicial ideology.77
In other research, Jacobi and Sag sought to measure the 
ideology of certain Supreme Court opinions.78 However, their 
research was not a direct study of content.79 The study assumed 
certain ideology based on models of the ideological preferences of 
the justices of the majority coalition.80 It assumed the reliability of 
the outcome coding and assumed that patterns of deciding outcomes 
could be transferred to patterns of opinion writing.81 Studies show 
that Supreme Court votes do not fall at all precisely along ideological 
lines, so this is an imperfect proxy for using ideology for content.82
And even if the research succeeded in identifying opinion ideology, 
it still says nothing about the opinion content that created the 
ideology.
There is a need for more direct study of opinion content 
through techniques such as linguistic analysis. This research is a 
beginning, but only barely begins to tap the potential of linguistic 
analysis of Supreme Court opinions. There is some new research on 
judicial “plagiarism,” where the opinion uses language from briefs or 
lower court opinions, but little analysis of when and why this 
happens.83
75. Id. at 1048-49.
76. Id. at 1044, 1046.
77. Id. at 1044.
78. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: 
Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1 (2009).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Another study sought to identify the ideology of opinions based 
on the precedents that the justices cited in the opinion. Tom S. Clark & Benjamin 
Lauderdale, Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space, 54 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 871 (2010).
82. Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Measuring 
Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 819, 819 (2008).
83. See Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The 
Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468 (2008); Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. 
Collins Jr. & Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion 
Content, 73 J. POL. 31 (2009).
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An unpublished article sought to place opinions on an 
ideological scale based on their language.84 The authors found that 
liberal justices tended to more often use certain words, like equality
or discrimination, while conservatives used different words, such as 
rational.85 The intriguing study coded relatively few cases, though, 
and was not followed up upon.
Potentially, such analysis of opinion content could greatly 
enhance our understanding of the judging process and the importance 
of opinion language. Such analysis might allow researchers “to 
verify or refute the empirical claims about case law that are implicit 
or explicit.”86 Certain types of language may prove more or less 
powerful. Perhaps words can be used to reveal ideological bias of the 
justices. The analysis permits evaluation of judicial reasoning (or the 
lack thereof). This Article represents a first step in the linguistic 
analysis of Supreme Court opinions.
B. The Linguistic-Analysis Program
Several different programs have been used for linguistic 
analysis in different contexts. We use the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) program for our analysis.87 LIWC is probably 
the most commonly used program for analysis of at least large texts 
and has been validated, as discussed below. The program has been 
updated and revised several times to enhance its abilities and 
accuracy.88
84. Kevin T. McGuire & Georg Vanberg, Mapping the Policies of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Data, Opinions, and Constitutional Law (Sept. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The procedure was further discussed 
in another unpublished paper. Michael C. Evans et al., Recounting the Courts? 
Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research (1st 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Aug. 28, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
914126.
85. McGuire & Vanberg, supra note 84, at 8.
86. See Hall & Wright, supra note 61, at 77.
87. One of the authors, James Pennebaker, is the developer of this program. 
For a discussion of the development of the program, see Yla R. Tausczik & James 
W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized 
Text Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 24 (2010). Many of the 
findings of research using the tool are summarized in JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, THE 
SECRET LIFE OF PRONOUNS (2011).
88. Inevitably, such a system makes errors because it simply identifies 
words that can be used in many ways. However there are enough studies using this 
program “to determine that statistically it is usually correct and the good news is that 
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One simply runs a text through the program. It identifies the 
number of particular words. These include the number of words in 
each dictionary for a particular communication style. The program
then provides the relative frequency of usage of each word category. 
We took the opinions of the first five years of the Roberts Court and 
had LIWC analyze them.
LIWC enables testing of many word usages, including 
pronouns, adverbs, tenses, and the like. The program also contains 
dictionaries of thousands of words associated with different types of 
speech. Dictionaries tap different domains of emotion or reason and 
are the collections of words that define particular categories to be 
measured. Words were categorized by various judges. A commonly 
used dictionary is for affective processes, such as positive and 
negative emotions. Another is for cognitive processes, including 
certainty, insight, causation, and other factors.
Emotion measurements are a common use of LIWC, but it has 
other capabilities.89 It can be used to assess relative status and social 
hierarchy, social coordination, group processes, honesty and 
deception by speakers, closeness of relationships, and cognitive 
thinking styles.90 A recent study examined communications in 
various groups, including Supreme Court oral arguments, to 
determine the relative dominance of particular group members.91
The program does not capture the subtleties of communication 
or grasp the true meaning of the author. It cannot understand irony or 
sarcasm or do justice to the full complexity of communication.92
LIWC is not a measure of content so much as of linguistic style.93
However, it is nonetheless “highly informative about several 
the more words there are available to analyze, the more precise the system.” 
PENNEBAKER, supra note 87, at 9.
89. Tausczik & Pennebaker, supra note 87, at 24.
90. Id. at 33-35.
91. Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., Echoes of Power: Language 
Effects and Power Differences in Social Interaction, 2012 WWW 699, 701 (2012).
92. Klaus Fiedler, Malte Friese & Michaela Wänke, Psycholinguistic 
Methods in Social Psychology, in COGNITIVE METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 170, 
177 (Karl Christoph Klauer, Andreas Voss & Christoph Stahl eds., abr. ed. 2011); 
Tausczik & Pennebaker, supra note 87, at 30 (noting that the programs “ignore 
context, irony, sarcasm, and idioms”); see also PENNEBAKER, supra note 87, at 9 
(noting that LIWC is a probabilistic system that “makes lots of errors” but that there 
have been enough studies to conclude that “it is usually correct”).
93. The style is quite important. The quiet words, unrelated to content, “can 
say more about a person than the more meaningful ones.” PENNEBAKER, supra note 
87, at 18.
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psychological processes and individual differences.”94 Researchers 
have found evidence that people’s physical and mental health are 
correlated with the words they use.95 Linguistic style is a meaningful 
way of exploring personality.96
Thanks to its wide use, LIWC has seen validation testing. For 
example, one study compared the LIWC scale of communicative 
content with independent judges’ scoring on a sample of women 
writing in a breast cancer support group.97 The study found that the 
LIWC results correlated significantly with the judges’ measures for 
negative concepts, positive concepts, and cognitive mechanisms, 
though not for every measure.98 A similar study confirmed these 
findings.99 Another study of college students found that the LIWC 
characterization of language effectively corresponded to the 
evaluations of independent judges.100
The LIWC program has demonstrated its validity for general 
purposes. Its word identification procedure inevitably means it will 
not always capture the meaning of language or its underlying 
emotions.101 However, on an overall basis, it has been shown to be a 
reliable indicator.102
Judicial opinions are a unique form of language. A justice’s 
opinion language will surely be different from his or her spoken 
language or other writings. Opinion writing is governed by certain 
conventions and commonly cites to prior cases, and these differences 
94. Fiedler, Friese & Wänke, supra note 92, at 178.
95. See, e.g., Stanley D. Rosenberg & Gary J. Tucker, Verbal Behavior and 
Schizophrenia: The Semantic Dimension, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1331 
(1979).
96. See James W. Pennebaker & Laura A. King, Linguistic Styles: 
Language Use as an Individual Difference, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1296 (1999).
97. Georg W. Alpers et al., Evaluation of Computerized Text Analysis in an 
Internet Breast Cancer Support Group, 21 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 361 (2005).
98. Id. at 369.
99. Erin O’Carroll Bantum & Jason E. Owen, Evaluating the Validity of 
Computerized Content Analysis Programs for Identification of Emotional 
Expression in Cancer Narratives, 21 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 79 (2009).
100. James W. Pennebaker & Martha E. Francis, Cognitive, Emotional, and 
Language Processes in Disclosure, 10 COGNITION & EMOTION 601, 606, 622 (1996).
101. See Jeffrey H. Kahn et al., Measuring Emotional Expression with the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, 120 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 263 (2007).
102. See id. (evaluating LIWC in experiments and concluding that it 
accurately captured emotional states); Tausczik & Pennebaker, supra note 87, at 32 
(observing that “[r]esearch suggests that LIWC accurately identifies emotion in 
language use”); Owens & Wedeking, supra note 71, at 1040 n.15 (noting that “[t]he 
internal and external validity of LIWC has been established”).
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may affect our analysis. For example, considerable research 
examines the significance of the use of the personal pronoun “I.”103
Supreme Court justices, though, consistently eschew the use of the 
pronoun in opinion writing.104 The proscription on the word “I” 
involves majority opinions, and the word may appear in separate 
opinions.105
In addition, a judicial opinion is communicating to a special 
audience, focused on lawyers, other judges, and legal scholars, which 
surely affects appropriate writing style. This illustrates how some of 
the tools of linguistic analysis may be inapplicable to the evaluation 
of opinions because of conventions particular to the latter context. 
One commentator’s review of opinions from the 1992 Term 
suggested that all of the opinions “seem to write and sound alike.”106
Perhaps the very nature of a Supreme Court opinion forces all 
justices into a stylistic consistency.
Judicial opinion language has another characteristic different 
from ordinary language. Typically language is to communicate with, 
often to persuade, listeners. But the language of Supreme Court 
opinions goes beyond mere communication. When the Court 
announces a legal rule, it is an order that need not depend on 
persuasion. The fashioning of language may therefore be different.
While the judicial opinion context can make some forms of 
analysis unhelpful, other measures may still be significant. Opinion 
writing shares much in common with ordinary language, otherwise it 
would not be understood. Griffin Bell stressed that “[a]ny study of 
style in judicial writing must begin with an examination of style in 
writing generally.”107 Judicial opinions share features with the novel, 
103. See generally GEORGE, supra note 33.
104. See Tony Mauro, Justice’s Supreme Use of ‘I’ Sparks a Legal Frenzy,
USA TODAY, April 2, 1999, at 11A (discussing Justice Breyer’s use of the pronoun 
“I” in an opinion as breaking “an unwritten rule against speaking individually in 
Supreme Court opinions, a tradition that goes back nearly 200 years”). Judges are 
directed to write “in the impersonal third person” rather than first person. GEORGE,
supra note 33, at 385. The source cautions that “use of the first person singular 
pronoun . . . creates several undesirable impressions” and may cause an opinion to 
lose “its intended force.” Id. at 386. The author stressed that the opinion is written 
for the court as an institution, while the word “I” suggests a personal product. Id. at 
467. However, it might sometimes be appropriate. Id. The handbook similarly 
discourages use of the word “we.” Id. at 468-69.
105. See Mauro, supra note 104.
106. DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 57.
107. Bell, supra note 50, at 214. He further observes that “there can be no 
substance without form,” which is why judges pay close attention to it. Id. at 219; 
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the letter, the treatise, and the work of history and criticism, and 
these factors open “different directions for future growth” of the 
law.108
No single program available can capture all the relevant 
elements of judicial style in opinion writing. 
But even such pedestrian elements of style such as the use of 
adverbs, adjectives, nouns, and verbs have importance.109 The same 
is surely true of words expressing cognition, uncertainty, or positive 
or negative emotions. LIWC has dictionaries that enable for testing 
of a variety of styles of communication.
The potential implications of such findings are great. Perhaps 
different linguistic styles make opinions more or less powerful. An 
opinion may be more authoritative or more tentative.110 Perhaps 
“pedantry” or “excessive footnoting” may undermine an opinion’s 
authority.111 Words may be used to emphasize certain principles of a 
decision or perhaps to cover up a lack of precedential authority for a 
holding.
Scientific articles in psychology have been studied to see if 
more readable articles are more influential, using the traditional 
Flesch complexity scale in addition to LIWC.112 Hartley, Sotto, and 
Pennebaker found a difference for articles chosen as influential, 
though not for highly cited articles.113 Readability, though, is a more 
primitive measure than modern text analysis programs, such as 
LIWC, provide.
We apply the LIWC to the opinions of the Roberts Court to 
find justice-specific characteristics. Of course, this involves an 
assumption that the justices themselves are the authors of opinions. It 
is no secret that justices work closely with their clerks in opinion 
see also Gibson, supra note 40, at 918 (suggesting that poets and legal writers share 
common writing tasks).
108. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV.
447, 447 (2001). He recognizes that there are some differences in the approaches but 
suggests that “it may be impossible for humans to understand a human’s behavior 
except as part of a story.” Id. at 447, 455.
109. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L. REV.
579, 585 (1983); Posner, supra note 41, at 1423-24. Both note the relevance of the 
use of these elements of language.
110. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION:
INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 147-48 (2007).
111. ALDISERT, supra note 44, at 143.
112. James Hartley, Eric Sotto & James Pennebaker, Style and Substance in 
Psychology: Are Influential Articles More Readable than Less Influential Ones?, 32 
SOC. STUD. SCI. 321, 323, 330 (2002).
113. Id. at 325, 331.
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writing, and the clerks may have influence over the language.114
Some have suggested that the justices “delegate[] a shocking amount 
of the actual opinion writing to their clerks.”115 A former clerk of 
Justice White, though, wrote that a clerk’s dreams of shaping the law 
were “short-lived—terminating with the return of the draft bleeding 
with red ink from the Justice’s pen, or more recently with the sound 
of the Justice’s word processor as he worked on revisions to the 
draft.”116 Some justices (Brennan and Powell) reportedly did most of 
their opinion writing.117 As one might expect, practices differed 
among the justices.118 The dispute over the role of clerks, though, has 
been largely anecdotal.
The relative influence of clerks has been more closely 
examined.119 A study used survey data on the political ideology of 
former law clerks to see if they appeared to influence votes.120 They 
114. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 141, 143, 144 (1996) (discussing increased reliance on clerks for at least 
drafts of opinions); DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 30 (suggesting that “there is little 
argument as to whether the law clerks write the opinions of the High Court”).
115. Stuart Taylor Jr. & Benjamin Wittes, Of Clerks and Perks, ATL.
MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2006, at 50. The authors contend that Justices Ginsburg, 
Thomas, and Kennedy “have clerks write most or all of their first drafts,” which may 
go unchanged. Id.; see also ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
226 (2006) (citing reports of clerks that a number of opinions were issued without 
material modification of their original drafts). An evaluation of Justice Marshall’s 
opinions for one term found four distinctively different styles of writing, 
corresponding to his four clerks. Peter Huber, Advice to Justice Thomas, FORBES,
Nov. 25, 1991, at 202. The controversy is long-standing and was highlighted in BOB 
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979). Archibald Cox wrote “of the increasing use of law clerks who write opinions 
to justify their Justices’ votes.” ARCHIBALD COX, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 88
(1981). Philip Kurland noted that “more and more” Supreme Court opinions were 
“written by the law clerks rather than their Justices.” Philip B. Kurland, Book 
Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 197-98 (1997).
116. Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron White, 1994 BYU L.
REV. 349, 351-52 (1994); see also POSNER, supra note 114, at 145 (observing that 
“[t]he fact that a law clerk writes an opinion draft does not by itself enable one to 
measure the clerk’s contribution to the opinion as eventually published”).
117. DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 31.
118. See id. at 30-42. The author reviews the practice of justices over the 
years. Id. He notes that one of Justice Murphy’s biographers doubts he ever fully 
wrote an opinion. Id. at 39. Justice Douglas, by contrast, apparently wrote virtually 
all his opinions. Id. at 41.
119. See Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on 
Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 
(2008).
120. Id. at 53.
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found that clerks appeared to exercise some ideological influence, 
though the size of the effect was much less than that of the justice’s 
own ideology.121 The study did not consider the effect of clerks on 
opinion language. Other research indicates that more clerks are 
associated with more citations in Supreme Court opinions.122 Perhaps 
clerks substantially influence opinion language as well. Today, 
“evidence shows that some justices routinely issue opinions wholly 
written by their clerks with little or no changes.”123
Authorship is one area where linguistic analysis had been used 
for judicial opinions. An article used a less intricate means of 
linguistic analysis to assess how significant clerks were in 
determining the content of judicial opinions.124 The authors took 
random text samples for the opinions of numerous circuit court 
judges.125 While the study focused on comparing judges, it found 
ample evidence of judicial authorship.126
A study at the Supreme Court level compared first drafts of 
opinions from Justices Powell and Marshall in the 1985 term of the 
Court.127 Justice Marshall was reputed to have delegated considerable 
opinion writing to his clerks.128 The study used several stylistic 
characteristics, such as word length, footnote usage, and sentence 
characteristics.129 The study found that Justice Marshall delegated 
more opinion writing than Justice Powell.130 The study was limited to 
one term, two justices, and draft (not final) opinions, but it did reveal 
some role of clerks.131
Even when a justice delegates, though, the language may still 
resemble that of the justice. Clerks may mimic a justice’s style. They 
121. Id. at 74 (displaying figure showing relative significance).
122. Cross et al., supra note 12, at 539.
123. IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR 
JUSTICES 9 (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012).
124. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their 
Opinions (And Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005).
125. Id. at 1098.
126. See id. at 1116, 1118.
127. Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Lee Sigelman, Ghostwriters on 
the Court? A Stylistic Analysis of U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Drafts, 30 AM. POL.
RES. 166, 166 (2002).
128. Id. But see Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren, 80 
GEO. L.J. 2109, 2112 (1992) (declaring that Justice Marshall may have relied more 
heavily on his clerks, but that “his practices were not wildly out of line with those of 
the others on the Court”).
129. Wahlbeck, Spriggs & Sigelman, supra note 127, at 176-77.
130. Id. at 182.
131. Id. at 168.
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may be “familiar with the justice’s style, and his penchant for using 
particular words and phrases.”132 The clerk’s writing may reflect that 
of the justice.
III. ANALYSIS OF ROBERTS COURT OPINIONS
In this Section we apply LIWC measures to the opinions of the 
Roberts Court through 2010. This included 342 majority opinions. 
We excluded all opinions of fewer than one hundred words, for 
which the program’s reliability was uncertain; these were generally 
separate opinions.
We began by examining differences in types of opinions: 
majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents. One would expect 
different types of decisions to have different linguistic 
characteristics, and we examine the different features of different 
opinion types. One of the most interesting questions is the different 
features of writing by the different justices of the Court. We also 
evaluate opinions from the justices broken down by type of opinion.
A. Majority Opinions vs. Separate Opinions
Our initial analysis compares the language of majority opinions 
and separate opinions. Such opinions have distinctly significant 
implications for the state of the law and have a different dynamic, as 
majorities by their nature must persuade other justices to join. As a
result, one might expect linguistic analysis to reveal differences in 
their content. We theorize that separate opinions will have different 
linguistic profiles for reasons discussed below.
1. Linguistic Analyses of Opinions
LIWC has many tools for linguistic analysis. These include 
simple matters, such as use of punctuation and sentence length. 
While these may be revealing, their implications in judicial opinions 
are obscure. There are also a number of dictionaries to categorize 
132. Robert M. O’Neil, Charting Civil Liberties and Protecting Free 
Expression: Learning from and Working with Justice William J. Brennan, in IN
CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES, supra 
note 123, at 284, 290. Justice Ginsburg’s clerks, for example, had to adapt to her 
particular style of writing. Todd C. Peppers, The Modern Clerkship: Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg and Her Law Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT 
LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES, supra note 123, at 391, 397-98.
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language usage. Some of these, such as references to families and 
sex, are not plainly relevant to the analysis of judicial opinions. 
Several categories, though, have a more apparent relevance in this 
context.
One significant feature of an opinion may lie in its certainty or 
tentativeness. Judge Schaefer suggested that while an opinion “‘may 
be the result of a very modest degree of conviction, it is usually 
written in terms of ultimate certainty.’”133 Chemerinsky likewise 
notes that “[o]pinions are written to make results seem determinate 
and value-free.”134 But the linguistic style of an opinion may reveal 
latent doubt about the grounds for decision.
LIWC has dictionaries to measure certainty and 
tentativeness.135 The dictionary for certainty includes words such as 
undoubtedly, precisely, absolutely, definitely, positively, always,
never, and the like. Words for tentativeness include depending,
hesitant, perhaps, uncertain, and uses of doubt.
The implications of the use of certain or tentative words are not 
so clear as they might facially seem. Indeed, words of certainty may 
be used as a defensive mechanism when a justice is in fact uncertain. 
One study of students found that tentativeness was associated with 
greater critical thinking, while certainty was associated with lesser 
critical thinking.136
In addition to the dictionaries that measure certainty and 
tentativeness, counts of other word types may be significant. One 
typically overlooks the use of articles, such as a and the. But people 
use them at very different rates, and research has found that “high 
article users tend to be more organized and emotionally stable.”137
The justices’ opinions showed very little difference on this scale, 
however.
133. KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION
186 (2013) (quoting Schaefer, supra note 29, at 9).
134. Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 2010. Thus, “opinions are written to 
make it seem that there is only one correct result and that it was derived in a 
formalistic fashion.” Id. at 2012.
135. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
136. Monica Metrick Kennison, The Evaluation of Critical Thinking, 
Reflective Writing, and Cognitive Word Use in Baccalaureate Nursing Students 
(2003) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, West Virginia University) (on file with West 
Virginia University wvuScholar Institutional Repository).
137. PENNEBAKER, supra note 87, at 37. The author analyzed a debate 
answer from McCain and Obama on education and found that McCain’s greater 
usage of articles was associated with more concrete thinking about the problem. Id.
at 299.
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2. Majority Opinion Author Language
We first analyze the majority opinions of the Court. The 
linguistic content of a majority opinion is not solely that of its author. 
The drafter of the opinion must hold together his or her majority 
coalition.138 The content of the opinion may be “a function of the 
majority’s preferences,” not just that of its author.139 Justices must 
take into account the positions of their colleagues in framing their 
own position.140 The selected author typically circulates an opinion, 
in response to which other justices issue bargaining statements 
seeking changes in the original opinion language.141 In several major 
cases, significant changes in the opinion resulted from such 
bargaining statements.142 Justice Frankfurter observed that “[w]hen 
you have to have at least five people to agree on something, they 
can’t have that comprehensive completeness of candor which is open 
to a single man, giving his own reasons untrammeled by what 
anybody else may do or not do if he put that out.”143 A survey of the 
papers of Justices Blackmun and Marshall revealed that in about 
80% of their majority opinions, some accommodation was made to 
the preferences of their colleagues.144
Perhaps the content is driven not by the author but by the vote 
of the ideologically median justice of the Court.145 Chief Justice 
138. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 62 (2008).
139. Id.
140. See FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000) (discussing 
how in collective decision making the outcome is responsive to each group 
member’s preferences).
141. See id. at 65.
142. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 100-05
(1998).
143. HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 298 (1960).
144. CORLEY, supra note 17, at 43-44.
145. See Pablo T. Spiller, Book Review: The Choices Justices Make, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 943, 943 (2000) (reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 142)
(suggesting that “[o]nce the median policy is proposed, no other proposal will beat 
it, and it becomes the outcome”). The general theory provides that “Supreme Court 
opinion authors make strategic calculations about the need to craft opinions that are 
acceptable to their colleagues on the bench.” Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II 
& Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on 
the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 294 (1998); see also
Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the 
US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 276-77 (2007) (observing that if the 
median voter theorem applied, “the content of every Supreme Court opinion must 
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Rehnquist has acknowledged that the author is “under considerable 
pressure” to accommodate the demands of other justices.146 Justice 
Brennan observed that he had “converted more than one proposed 
majority opinion into a dissent before the final decision was 
announced,” and offers an example of where he had “circulated 10 
printed drafts before one was approved as the Court opinion.”147
Creating “an opinion requires delicate balancing of opposing views, 
persuasive argumentation, and often subtle or not so subtle 
negotiation and bargaining.”148 Clearly, majority opinions are not 
purely the product of their author.
Judge Wald has noted that “the drafting of majority opinions is 
a delicate political and human relations undertaking, [which] 
precludes the exercise of pure stylistic preference by a judge in 
choosing relevant rationales, rhetoric, issues, legal doctrines, 
precedents, authorities, and even linguistic flourishes.”149 Insofar as 
the majority opinion is a bit of a committee product, one might 
expect this to affect its language. Lawyers and judges, therefore, are 
less likely to view the majority opinion as a “personal” expression of 
the authoring justice.150 Yet this effect can be exaggerated. Often “the 
opinion’s author succeeds in swallowing other voices.”151
The role of the author of a majority opinion is uncertain. This 
assignee surely has some influence over opinion content. However, 
this may be reduced by collegial accommodation. These opinions 
may therefore be somewhat less revealing about the writing of a 
particular justice.
devolve to the wishes of the median justice; the identity and preferences of the 
opinion’s author . . . cannot matter”).
146. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 264 (rev. & updated ed. 
2001). He also noted that “give and take is inevitable, and doctrinal purity may be 
muddied in the process.” William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Process of Judging,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 263, 270 (1992).
147. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court,
31 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 393, 405 (1960).
148. JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 46 (David M. O’Brien ed., 
1997).
149. Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s 
Appellate Opinions, 1981-82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During 
an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 658 (2000).
150. Leubsdorf, supra note 108, at 489.
151. Id. at 448.
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3. Dissenting Opinion Author Language
We next consider the language of dissents. A dissenting 
opinion has a different dynamic from one speaking for the Court. 
They may reflect the sincere self-expression of the justice. Justice 
Scalia declared that “[t]o be able to write an opinion solely for
oneself, without the need to accommodate, to any degree 
whatsoever, the more-or-less-differing views of one’s colleagues . . . 
is indeed an unparalleled pleasure.”152 A dissenting justice “has the 
license to speak with a more distinctive voice than the author of a 
majority opinion.”153 A dissent enables a judge the “opportunity to 
engage in unfettered creativity.”154 Or it may be a tool of political 
agitation or psychological release.155
Because of limited resources, a dissent is likely to be on a 
matter on which the justice feels strongly.156 This is equally true of a 
concurring opinion.157 Such powerful opinions are likely to influence 
the language chosen for such opinions. Authors of separate opinions 
may be expected to write with a particular vigor specific to the 
justice.
Style may be critical to the power and influence of a dissenting 
opinion. Posner suggests that Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. 
New York158 is at the top of all dissenting opinions issued by the 
Court, despite the fact that it is “not well reasoned.”159 It had this 
152. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 33, 
42 (1994). Justice Douglas declared that “[t]he right to dissent is the only thing that 
makes life tolerable for a judge of an appellate court.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS,
AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960).
153. Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent,
61 TEMP. L. REV. 307, 346 (1988).
154. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s 
First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial 
Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73, 78 (2004).
155. Id. at 79-81.
156. See, e.g., PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT
71 (reprt. ed. 1977) (discussing Justice Brandeis and noting that he frequently did 
not write in dissent simply “because the demands of other items of work prevented 
an adequate treatment” of the question).
157. Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy: Judicial Opinions and 
Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH, supra note 148,
at 105 (suggesting that such opinions are the product of the “fighting conviction” on 
the part of the judge).
158. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
159. POSNER, supra note 53, at 266-67.
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effect because of its style, which fell “[b]etween the extremes of 
logical persuasion and emotive persuasion.”160
Differences in linguistic content in majority opinions may not 
be solely due to the need to accommodate other justices, though. 
When writing for the majority, the justice is making the law of the 
United States. A dissent may be more of a screed, calling for a 
change in direction of the governing law, but realizing that its precise 
language carries less power. Hence, the very act of writing a majority 
opinion may have a moderating effect for justices. Justice Cardozo 
suggested that the author of the majority opinion was “cautious, 
timid, fearful of the vivid word, the heightened phrase.”161 Our 
analysis to date does not enable a separation of these effects.
A dissenting or concurring opinion, by contrast, may, in Justice 
Cardozo’s words, be “irresponsible.”162 Such an opinion does not 
carry the burden of speaking for the Court or even creating law. Nor 
does the opinion have any great need to accommodate other justices. 
While such opinions may have others join them, the joiners are 
largely unnecessary. The opinion may issue as written by its author 
regardless of whether it finds joiners.
While justices have expressed the freedom associated with 
writing a dissent, even such an opinion may be inhibited. Writing 
more respectfully may “confer additional legitimacy” on the opinion 
and legitimate the court as a whole.163 A Harvard Law Review
evaluation of Roberts Court dissents found that they were quite 
respectful in nature and rarely assertive.164 Moreover, even dissents 
may have multiple joiners, and the opinion author may be trying to 
hold together a coalition, though this is obviously much less 
significant than for a majority opinion. Even dissents may be 
influenced by collegiality, but they should reveal characteristics of 
the dissenter who writes the opinion.
160. Id. at 272.
161. JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH, supra note 148, at 46 
(citing Tom Clark, Address at University of Minnesota Law School: Some Thoughts 
on Supreme Court Practice (Apr. 13, 1959)).
162. Id. (citing Clark, supra note 161).
163. Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” 
Dissent, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (2011).
164. Id. at 1322-26.
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4. Concurring Opinion Author Language
Concurring opinions have been less analyzed theoretically, yet 
some concurrences have proven to be quite significant. Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube165 has been 
called “the greatest single opinion” of the Supreme Court.166 In 
general, “concurrences have more authority than dissents,” and “the 
concurrences bracketing the majority opinion may shape the 
evolution of the law as they limit, expand, clarify, or contradict the 
Court opinion.”167 When the majority is but a plurality, it is a 
concurrence that sets what the law is.168
The primary work on concurrences is by Pamela Corley.169
Corley notes that, like dissents, “concurring opinions are not the 
product of compromise as are majority opinions.”170 As a result, they 
may be more revealing of the author. Concurrences may be of 
different types,171 and they may be written for different reasons.172 At 
least some concurring opinions may have a major effect on the law. 
Corley shows how certain concurrences may strengthen or 
undermine the power of a Supreme Court opinion, as applied by 
lower courts.173
Concurrences, like dissents but unlike majority opinions, 
probably are almost entirely driven by the author. The average 
concurrence represents only two justices.174 It seems unlikely that a 
concurrer would compromise his or her language to please a single 
165. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).
166. Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include The 
Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 
242 n.2 (2000). Similarly, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion has formed the basis 
of Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 44 
(2001).
167. CORLEY, supra note 17, at 5.
168. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
169. CORLEY, supra note 17.
170. Id. at 6.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics 
of Dissents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. RES. 488 
(1999) (explaining how concurrences may reflect ideological, strategic, or 
institutional differences among the justices).
173. CORLEY, supra note 17, at 71-93.
174. See data in Nancy Maveety, Charles C. Turner & Lori Beth Way, The 
Rise of the Choral Court: Use of Concurrence in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
63 POL. RES. Q. 627, 633 (2010).
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other justice. Consequently, concurring opinions offer a window into 
justices’ writing characteristics and should have features not found in 
majority opinions.
5. Linguistic Characteristics of Different Opinion 
Categories
This Subsection sets out our analysis of the linguistic 
differences in different types of opinions. We begin with a simple 
analysis of the number of words found in these opinions. Then we 
employ certain dictionaries of the LIWC to search for other 
characteristics of the opinions, including certainty, use of cognitive 
words, anger, and relative positivity of emotional expressions.
The simplest way to measure differences in opinions is by 
simply examining the different number of words each uses. Figure 1 
reveals the results for concurrences, dissents, majority opinions, and 
per curiam opinions in a dot plot.
Figure 1
Words by Types of Opinions
Majority opinions are the longest, followed by dissents, and the 
differences are considerable. Concurrences tend to be brief, shorter 
than per curiam opinions. Majority opinions are presumably longer 
because they need to set out the law, while separate opinions need 
not do so and may take issue with only a portion of the majority’s 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
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opinion. The need for more signers may also cause some lengthening 
of majority opinions. While this supports the different characteristics 
of different opinions, it says little about the language they contain, 
which we proceed to study.
We begin our analysis of the linguistic content of opinions by 
analyzing their use of words of certainty. We would expect majority 
opinions to use less certainty because they are setting the content of 
the law and would want to allow some flexibility in its application to 
different facts.175 Moreover, the need to have more justices sign on to 
the opinion could well result in less expression of certainty in setting 
the law. The following figure displays the relative differences in 
certainty.
Figure 2
Certainty by Types of Opinions
The results are much as we anticipated. Concurring and 
dissenting opinions have more words of certainty than do those 
issued by the majority. The much lower levels of certainty in per 
curiam opinions is less clear, perhaps due to the fact that these tend 
175. A recent article has examined when and why justices would want to 
allow more flexibility in their opinions, based on expected applications by lower 
courts. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory 
of Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39-40.
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to be issued in less salient cases. The differences by opinion type are 
statistically significant.
The LIWC also has measures for cognitive reasoning in texts. 
Because the program only checks for words, it provides no close 
scale for analytical reasoning. The overall cognitive measure 
includes words for expressing insight, causation, discrepancy, and 
other factors. This includes the certainty measure, but only as a small 
percentage of its score. The cognitive mechanism measure has not 
been much studied. Owens and Wedeking suggest that greater 
numbers of cognitive words are associated with complexity, in 
opposition to simpler Court opinions.176
We have no a priori reason to theorize how this cognitive 
measure would vary between majority and separate opinions, though 
we would expect lower scores for per curiam opinions, which are 
simpler and more straightforward. The results for the measure are 
displayed in the following figure.
Figure 3
Cognitive Mechanisms by Type of Opinion
The differences are not dramatic, but separate opinions tend to 
use more cognitive words, with per curiam opinions using the 
fewest. Although the differences may appear small, they were highly 
statistically significant in an analysis of variance test. Examination of 
176. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 71, at 1038.
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the subcategories shows the primary difference for opinion types to 
be in use of words of insight (such as think and know). Just as 
majority coalitions reduce certainty, they appear to reduce cognitive 
words. Perhaps separate opinions must have a somewhat greater 
cognitive component in order to deal with the arguments of the 
majority. Perhaps majority opinions are simpler in order to set out 
easier rules for lower courts to follow.
Another possible language test would involve words of anger 
found in Supreme Court opinions. One might expect dissents to show 
more anger due to their view that the majority opinion creates an 
erroneous state of the law.177 The role of the LIWC’s anger words 
has been primarily studied in the context of health care. This 
research has reached interesting findings, such as that the expression 
of anger was associated with less depression and a higher quality of 
life.178 The expression of anger may thus be a healthy reflex.
Figure 4
Anger by Type of Opinion
177. Conversely, words of anger may be more likely to appear in the 
majority opinion’s response to any dissenters.
178. Morton A. Lieberman, Effects of Disease and Leader Type on 
Moderators in Online Support Groups, 24 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2446, 2448 
(2008); Morton A. Lieberman & Benjamin A. Goldstein, Not All Negative Emotions 
Are Equal: The Role of Emotional Expression in Online Support Groups for Women 
with Breast Cancer, 15 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 160, 164 (2006).
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There is not a great difference between the levels of anger in 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Per curiam opinions 
show significantly higher levels of anger, though the reason for this 
is obscure. While we expected separate opinions might show more 
anger, they actually showed less of this emotion.
The LIWC also has dictionaries for positive emotion words and 
negative emotion words. One study validated this measure by 
showing that songwriters who committed suicide tended to use more 
negative emotion words and fewer positive emotion words than those 
who did not.179 There is no obvious reason why different opinions 
should show different positive and negative emotions. Perhaps 
dissents would show more negativity, but the theory would be that 
associated with anger, which was not borne out by the results. We 
create a scale of relative positivity, representing positive emotion 
words minus negative emotion words. The results are displayed in 
the following figure.
Figure 5
Positivity by Type of Opinion
179. Erin J. Lightman et al., Using Computational Text Analysis Tools to 
Compare the Lyrics of Suicidal and Non-Suicidal Songwriters, Proceedings of the 
29th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, COGNITIVE SCI. J. ARCHIVE
(2007), available at
http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/Proceedings/2007/docs/p1217.pdf.
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As consistent with the findings on anger words, there is little 
difference by opinion type, though concurrences are somewhat more 
positive. Per curiam opinions are remarkably negative in 
emotionality.
The LIWC has numerous other dictionaries, but many seem 
inapplicable to Supreme Court opinion content. These include social 
processes, such as references to one’s family; biological processes, 
such as references to eating and sex; and religion. When these words 
appear in opinions, they seem likely to be in reference to the facts of 
the case rather than choices of opinions.
B. Characteristics of the Justices
The differences we found in opinion types were suggestive but 
did not consider the individual authors of those opinions. Indeed, the 
results may be skewed by the different justices authoring the 
opinions. While majority opinions are relatively equally divided in 
the Court, some justices are more likely to write separate opinions. 
Thus, the differences may be driven to some degree by the patterns 
of authorship. This Section considers the differences among the 
Court’s members.
Language usage is somewhat intrinsic to a person.180 Individual 
personality styles are revealed through linguistic choices.181 Hence, it 
is instructive to compare the scores of the different justices. 
Language is also affected by context. For example, a study of Alan 
Greenspan’s language showed that it changed over the course of the 
economic cycle.182 One might test Supreme Court opinions for the 
effect of numerous different circumstances, but our preliminary 
study is limited to opinion type. We examine the language of the 
justices of the period depending on the nature of the opinion issued 
under their name.
As noted above, majority opinions are not exclusively the 
product of the opinion author, and language in the opinion is 
180. Linguistic analysis can be used to identify anonymous authors. See
PENNEBAKER, supra note 87, at 255-90; Patrick Juola, Authorship Attribution, 1 
FOUND. & TRENDS INFO. RETRIEVAL 233, 239 (2006).
181. Juola, supra note 180, at 239.
182. See Jo Ann A. Abe, Changes in Alan Greenspan’s Language Use 
Across the Economic Cycle: A Text Analysis of His Testimonies and Speeches, 30 J.
LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 219 (2011). His use of words involving 
psychological distancing and cognitive complexity changed, but, surprisingly, 
positive emotionality did not. Id.
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different from that found in dissenting and concurring opinions.183
The study of majority opinion authors may still be meaningful, 
though. The majority author realizes that there are resource costs 
associated with writing a separate opinion.184 There are also resource 
costs associated with scrutinizing particular words of often quite 
lengthy opinions.185 These costs will exercise some deterrent effect 
on the efforts of other justices to insist upon changes in the 
majority’s language.186 Modelers have shown how the costs of 
writing separately enable the majority to have control over opinion 
content.187
Other justices issue bargaining statements in negotiations, 
calling for a change in opinion language in exchange for joining the 
opinion, but these are relatively rare.188 Some empirical research 
suggests that majority authors have significant control over opinion 
content.189 Prior research has relied on opinion authorship as a 
measure of influence for precedents.190 It is generally believed that 
selecting the opinion author is an important strategic move, which 
183. See supra Section III.A.
184. This is evident from empirical evidence finding that higher caseloads 
are associated with less dissenting behavior. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 105 (2011).
185. Id. at 103-04.
186. See, e.g., Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. 
Martinek, Separate Opinion Writing on the United States Courts of Appeals, 31 AM.
POL. RES. 215 (2003) (discussing costs of separate opinion writing); Lax & 
Cameron, supra note 145, at 277 (noting that the costs of opinion writing would 
drive a justice to accept language that he or she did not prefer). A model including 
these costs found that an opinion author would generally be able to draft the opinion 
that he or she desired. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling 
Collegial Courts (3): Judicial Objectives, Opinion Content, Voting and Adjudication 
Equilibria 18 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 08-54, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1296071.
187. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 145, at 279.
188. See, e.g., James F. Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’ Responses to Majority Opinion 
Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 498 (1999). Moreover, only a minority of such bargaining 
statements seemed to produce a change in the majority opinion language. EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 142, at 99.
189. See Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court 
Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998); Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, 
the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 890, 902-03 (2007) (considering the ideological alignment of the justices 
and finding that the opinion author appeared to have considerable control).
190. See Kosma, supra note 189, at 337.
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implies that such authorship is significant.191 The mere fact that 
opinions are signed by the author is some attribution of 
importance.192
Moreover, linguistic style may be a place where other justices 
are less likely to take issue with majority opinion authors. The 
relative use of particular emotions may not be a place where other 
justices are likely to quibble. For example, Justice Brennan had a 
reputation for sneaking into opinions a “seemingly innocuous casual 
statement or footnote” that would later be exploited to drive the 
law’s content.193 Perhaps language style is a place where other 
justices would be less demanding. Thus, we expect to see some 
differences in linguistics depending on the opinion’s author.
The opinion authors’ language will vary by type of opinion, as 
discussed in the preceding Section.194 Consequently, we differentiate 
the authors by opinion type. We again used the same LIWC 
standards discussed in the Section on opinion type.195 Sotomayor had 
only fifteen authored opinions in our data, so her results should be 
considered less reliable. In addition, her numbers may be affected by 
the “freshman effect.”196 All the other justices issued more than sixty 
opinions.
191. See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? 
Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 421-22
(1996). Justice Fortas declared, “If the Chief Justice assigns the writing of the 
opinion of the Court to Mr. Justice A, a statement of profound consequence may 
emerge[,]” but “[i]f he assigns it to Mr. Justice B, the opinion of the Court may be of 
limited consequence.” Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of 
Leadership, 84 YALE L.J. 405, 405 (1975).
192. See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 2032-33 (noting this fact and 
pointing to cases when the Court departed from its tradition of having a single 
author for opinions).
193. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL 
CHAMPION 343 (2010). Justice Powell told his clerks that Justice Brennan had a 
“‘demonstrated ability . . . to shape future decisions by the inclusion of general 
language unnecessary to the present opinion but apparently free from serious 
objection.’” Id. at 444 (quoting Note from Justice Powell to His Law Clerk (Apr. 21, 
1978)).
194. See supra Section III.A.
195. See supra Section III.A.
196. See, e.g., Terry Bowen, Consensual Norms and the Freshman Effect on 
the United States Supreme Court, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 222 (1995) (discussing the 
hypothesis that justices in their first year will be affected by their newness on the 
Court); Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb, II, Reassessing the “Freshman Effect”: The 
Voting Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921-
90, 15 POL. BEHAV. 1 (1993); Robert L. Dudley, The Freshman Effect and Voting 
Alignments: A Reexamination of Judicial Folklore, 21 AM. POL. Q. 360 (1993); 
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We begin by comparing the raw number of words per opinion 
by justice. The significance of this variable is somewhat obscure, as 
more words may simply be unnecessary.197 However, opinion length 
may be regarded as an indicator of legal style, displaying a more 
traditional approach to writing.198 On the other hand, brevity has been 
encouraged for judicial opinions.199
Longer opinions might be considered to be of higher quality.200
Every word of a Supreme Court opinion is legally significant and 
may be quoted by lower courts to resolve cases.201 We would 
hypothesize that justices who write longer opinions are more 
committed to defining the law and projecting the influence of the 
Supreme Court, while those who write shorter opinions prefer to 
keep things open and provide greater flexibility to future lower court 
decisions. The comparative average number of words used in 
opinions are displayed in the following table.
Table 1
Words by Justice
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Alito 4487 1133 3165
Breyer 4061 550 3363
Ginsburg 3953 507 2137
Kennedy 6490 1479 3983
Roberts 4821 1283 3643
Scalia 4272 1483 2649
Souter 4074 664 2371
Stevens 5888 1285 2787
Sotomayor 4185 1349 5062
Thomas 3227 1614 3309
Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshman Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1142 (1993).
197. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 12, at 627 (observing that “[m]any 
commentators contend Supreme Court opinions are [too] long and argue longer 
opinions result in a variety of negative consequences”). Longer opinions obviously 
take longer to read and understand and may “invite uncertainty” about the law. 
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
303 (7th ed. 2005).
198. See Posner, supra note 109, at 1429.
199. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 35.
200. See Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 
MICH L. REV. 961, 970-73 (1978) (suggesting that length, as well as citations, can 
bear on the quality of court opinions).
201. Indeed, research shows that longer opinions are more likely to be cited 
in the future. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 12, at 676-79.
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Justice Kennedy had the longest majority opinions, perhaps because 
he was assigned particularly important cases as the median justice.202
But he also wrote relatively long concurrences and the longest 
dissents (discounting the numbers for the relatively few Sotomayor 
dissents). Justices Thomas and Scalia wrote relatively long 
concurrences but relatively short dissents. Justice Breyer was the 
opposite. Justice Ginsburg seems particularly laconic, drafting 
shorter opinions regardless of opinion type. Justice Souter likewise 
wrote fewer words. Justice Scalia was rather pithy in majority 
opinions and dissents.
These preliminary results must be qualified for the lack of other 
considerations. Data shows that opinion length will vary depending 
on the size of the majority coalition, the significance of the case, the 
legal area of the case, the workload, and other factors.203 Some of 
these factors wash out because the justices were deciding the same 
set of cases in the same years.
Some preliminary conclusions may be drawn. Justices 
Ginsburg and Souter clearly write shorter opinions. Justice Kennedy 
writes especially long opinions, even when they are separate 
opinions. This has various possible implications. Longer opinions 
offer more law to the lower courts, but they may also have hedged 
the legal standards. Shorter opinions may be simpler and clearer.
The next category for observation is words of certainty. Higher 
levels of certainty by nature reveal more self-confidence in one’s 
legal conclusions. They may be associated with stronger, clearer 
legal rules. Research suggests that greater attitudinal certainty makes 
one resistant to change and may be associated with closed 
mindedness.204 One would want a certain level of certainty at the 
Supreme Court, to lay down clear rules, but not too much, which 
suggests being closed to persuasive argument.205 The precise, correct 
202. See Theodore S. Arrington & Saul Brenner, Testing Murphy’s Strategic 
Model: Assigning the Majority Opinion to the Marginal Justice in the Conference 
Coalition on the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. RES. 416 (2008). When an 
opinion is closely decided, assigning the majority opinion to the most moderate 
member of the majority coalition will reduce the risk that this justice will reverse 
course and destroy the majority.
203. See Black & Spriggs, supra note 12.
204. Joshua J. Clarkson, Zakary L. Tormala & Derek D. Rucker, Cognitive 
and Affective Matching Effects in Persuasion: An Amplification Perspective, 37 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1415, 1416 (2011). The authors note that 
these attitudes are less open to persuasion by others. Id.
205. Id.
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amount, of course, is indeterminate. By reputation, one might expect 
Justices Scalia and Thomas to show higher levels of certainty, but 
this is testable, and our results are reported in the following table.
Table 2
Certainty by Justice
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Alito 1.41 1.74 1.61
Breyer 1.42 1.48 1.47
Ginsburg 1.28 0.73 1.18
Kennedy 1.28 1.80 1.69
Roberts 1.26 1.60 1.66
Scalia 1.54 2.01 2.03
Souter 1.28 1.76 1.56
Stevens 1.53 1.91 1.61
Sotomayor 1.22 1.25 1.42
Thomas 1.41 1.38 1.66
Concurrences and dissents pretty consistently have more certainty. 
While one might expect deference to a majority opinion to reduce 
certainty, any such effect is clearly overcome by the lack of need to 
compromise with other justices.206 As expected, Justice Scalia has 
especially high levels of certainty in his opinions. Justice Thomas, 
though, shows rather low levels of certainty in his. Justice Ginsburg 
shows remarkably low levels of certainty, even considering her 
lower word counts.
The next analysis considers the relative use of words of 
cognitive mechanism. The LIWC searches for particular words that 
are associated with cognitive processes.207 The number of cognitive 
words per Justice is set forth in the table below.
Table 3
Cognitive Mechanisms by Justice
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Alito 14.95 16.75 15.86
Breyer 15.37 16.71 15.93
Ginsburg 13.76 14.27 14.31
Kennedy 15.09 17.63 15.90
206. See discussion supra Section III.A.
207. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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Roberts 14.72 15.82 15.50
Scalia 15.39 16.47 16.55
Souter 15.48 16.24 15.90
Stevens 14.82 16.74 16.10
Sotomayor 15.53 15.77 15.58
Thomas 14.24 15.19 15.30
For the justices, such cognitive words are most common in 
concurrences, followed by dissents, followed by majority opinions. 
Justice Ginsburg was again the lowest, due in part to her tendency to 
use fewer words of any sort. Justices Scalia and Stevens had the 
highest rates in dissent, while Justices Scalia, Souter, and Breyer had 
the highest rate in majority opinions. Justice Kennedy is especially 
high for concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor seems especially 
high on this scale, though with a small sample size. Justice Thomas, 
though, was relatively low across the board.
Owens and Wedeking suggest that such cognitive words reduce 
the clarity of an opinion’s law.208 This hypothesis is not an intrinsic 
implication of any of the words measured, however. Justice Scalia is 
high on cognitive words, yet is known for setting clear rules in 
opinions.209 There is nothing unclear about an absolute refusal to 
consider legislative history, for example. It seems plausible to 
consider more use of cognitive words as a sign of opinion quality, 
though this remains uncertain and subject to further examination.
The next comparison involves words of anger. While cognitive 
words seem associated with the cool, rational thinking expected of 
justices, the use of anger might seem to be a lapse by the justices. 
This is not necessarily the case, though, and the use of emotion may 
be a strategic tool that makes opinions more powerful.210
Words of anger may thus be strategically used. While one 
might expect dissenting opinions to use more words of anger 
objecting to the majority, the above Section demonstrated that this 
was not the case.211 While one might expect Scalia’s strong opinions 
about law to produce more words of anger, he is known within the 
Court as not angry, befriending other justices of different views, such 
208. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 71, at 1038.
209. Id. at 1027.
210. See Annie M. Smith, Comment, Great Judicial Opinions Versus Great 
Literature: Should the Two Be Measured by the Same Criteria?, 36 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 757, 757-58, 761-62 (2005).
211. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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as Justice Ginsburg.212 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer have 
a reputation of carefulness, where one might expect less anger. But 
both have strong views that might produce anger in an opinion. The 
Court of the era is relatively conservative, so perhaps liberals could 
be expected to show more anger.
The next analysis uses the same method to test for words of 
anger used by the justices; the table below shows the relatively few 
average words of anger used by each justice.
Table 4
Anger by Justice
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Alito .71 1.07 1.00
Breyer .83 .65 .65
Ginsburg .78 .44 .56
Kennedy .74 .57 .77
Roberts .64 .61 .55
Scalia .82 .67 .71
Souter .69 .77 .46
Stevens .83 .55 .65
Sotomayor .96 .31 .46
Thomas .66 .69 .84
Chief Justice Roberts showed the lowest use of anger overall, 
consistent with his relatively cool image. If we assume that dissents 
and concurrences are the most revealing of justices, though, more 
interesting patterns emerge. Justice Alito, and to a lesser degree 
Justice Thomas, show relatively high levels of anger when they 
disagree with majority opinions. Because these separate opinions are 
more likely the product of the authoring justice, they are revealing 
about their approach to opinion writing.
We follow this analysis with a consideration of positivity 
expressed in opinions. This is done by taking the score for positive 
emotion words and subtracting the negative emotion words found in 
opinions. The results are displayed in the following table.
212. See, e.g., Phil Brennan, Justice Scalia: Ruth Ginsburg Is My Best 
Friend, NEWSMAX (May 16, 2008, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/scalia-ginsberg/2008/05/16/id/323695/. 
Scalia reported that he was a good friend of all his colleagues and that Justice 
Ginsburg was his best friend. Id.
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Table 5
Positivity by Justice
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Alito 0.35 -.51 -.30
Breyer -.13 .39 .30
Ginsburg .47 .80 .23
Kennedy .12 .70 .21
Roberts .40 1.20 .68
Scalia .14 .11 .11
Souter .08 -.29 .70
Stevens .00 .12 .48
Sotomayor -.32 2.47 .46
Thomas .62 .28 -.36
Chief Justice Roberts seems to be the most positive of the justices.213
Justice Alito seems to be the most negative, as he is the only justice 
with negative scores for both concurrences and dissents, which are 
presumably more reliable indicators than majority opinions. One 
might expect dissents to be negative in lamenting the errors of the 
majority, but only Justices Alito and Thomas had negative positivity 
scores for dissents.
CONCLUSION
This is but a descriptive analysis meant to open the door to 
studies of more significance. The significance of opinion language in 
giving effect to opinions merits investigation. If opinions are meant 
as communication to the broader society, the language may affect 
compliance by the people or the other branches. Opinions are 
certainly meant as communication to judges deciding future cases, so 
language could be measured against precedential impact, including 
measures such as the likelihood of an opinion being distinguished in 
a future case.214 A great deal of research has used LIWC in other 
213. Justice Sotomayor’s unusually high positivity rating for concurrences 
should be discounted, as she only wrote two concurrences in our data set.
214. We have found, for example, that Justice Scalia’s opinions were 
powerful, both positively and negatively. See generally Frank B. Cross, 
Determinants of Citations to Supreme Court Opinions (and the Remarkable 
Influence of Justice Scalia), 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 177 (2010).
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contexts, especially health care, and it should be extended to 
analyzing the meaning of judicial opinions.
The opinion language chosen by a judge also provides insight 
into that judge’s personality.215 Judicial personalities are surely 
associated with different approaches to decision and opinion content. 
Some may be more effective than others. Justice Traynor’s 
personality was said to be important to his torts jurisprudence.216
LIWC has shown reliability as a measure of an individual’s 
personality differences.217 The significance of personality traits for 
judging is potentially important.
We can draw some preliminary conclusions about the justices. 
While Justices Alito and Roberts are commonly paired, and they vote 
quite similarly, Alito is far more angry and negative in his words, 
while Chief Justice Roberts is more upbeat. Justice Ginsburg uses 
relatively few words in her opinions. The differences for other 
justices are less profound.
Having produced certain findings, the implications are not 
entirely clear. Tetlock, Bernzweig, and Gallant suggest that greater 
cognitive complexity is a strength in judicial reasoning,218 while 
Owens and Wedeking suggest it may be a weakness, diminishing the 
clarity of the opinion.219 Others suggest that a balance is best.220 A
215. See discussion supra Section III.B.
216. See Wex S. Malone, Contrasting Images of Torts—The Judicial 
Personality of Justice Traynor, 13 STAN. L. REV. 779, 781 (1961).
217. See generally Lisa A. Fast & David C. Funder, Personality as Manifest 
in Word Use: Correlations with Self-Report, Acquaintance Report, and Behavior, 94 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 334 (2008); Francois Mairesse et al., Using 
Linguistic Cues for the Automatic Recognition of Personality in Conversation and 
Text, 30 J. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RES. 457, 465-67 (2007) (demonstrating how 
language can be used to reveal psychological characteristics such as introversion, 
conscientiousness, and agreeableness); James W. Pennebaker & Laura A. King, 
Linguistic Styles: Language Use as an Individual Difference, 77 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1296 (1999).
218. See Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, supra note 64, at 1232-33.
219. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 71, at 1038 (noting that “as 
opinions become more cognitively complex, they become less clear”).
220. GEORGE, supra note 33, at 463 (suggesting that the opinion “writer 
should strive for a middle of the road approach” so that the writing “be neither too 
complex nor too simple”). The author noted that Justice Cardozo, a renowned 
judicial stylist, tended to be simple with explication of the facts but became more 
complex in his legal analysis. Id. It has been suggested that Cardozo produced “a 
marked improvement in the style of legal writing.” DOMNARSKI, supra note 40, at 67 
(quoting Letter from Robert Jackson to Irving Dilliard).
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study of bloggers suggested that more complex language is 
associated with being more influential.221
There is some additional evidence on this question from studies 
in the military. One study found that when more group members 
expressed negative emotions, spoke of social processes, and used the 
present tense in internal communications, the group performed worse 
on several tasks.222 This provides some information on the nature of 
the best opinions, but it is certainly not conclusive.
The proper writing style for an opinion is certainly contested.223
As noted throughout this Article, some have given directions on the 
style in which judges should write, but their recommendations 
should not be considered to be conclusive. The use of textual 
analysis, as in this Article, may illuminate the most desirable style, 
though this requires further research. Perhaps some styles conduce to 
more citations, which would be considered a positive attribute, 
though not if those citations tended to be negative. The justices of 
history have different reputations, assigned by learned 
commentators, and style might be associated with these findings. 
Perhaps certain styles are associated with more ideological, as 
opposed to legal, conclusions. All these possibilities and others are 
important and testable. Linguistic analysis of opinions offers a 
valuable tool to examine the hypotheses about the significance of 
judicial opinion writing style.
221. See Thin Nguyen et al., Towards Discovery of Influence and 
Personality Traits Through Social Link Prediction (Proceedings of the Fifth Int’l 
Conference on Weblogs & Social Media, July 17-21, 2011), available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/221297946_Towards_Discovery_of_Influe
nce_and_Personality_Traits_through_Social_Link_Prediction.
222. Mary Dzindolet & Linda Pierce, Using Linguistic Analysis to Identify 
High Performing Teams (Army Res. Lab., June 2006), available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235204703_Using_Linguistic_Analysis_to
_Identify_High_Performing_Teams. Use of first person pronouns was also related to 
poor group performance. Id. at 13. In this study, some aspects of cognitive complex 
language were associated with better performance. Id.
223. Cass Sunstein has thus generally promoted a theory of judicial 
minimalism. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 23 (explaining the theory of rendering fact-
based decisions without overly broad legal conclusions). He identified certain 
justices as being minimalist in nature. Id. Some have sought to empirically measure 
minimalism in opinions. See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: 
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045 (2009). Various linguistic practices might be associated with 
minimalism, such as less certainty. Use of textual analysis may be employed to 
identify minimalist opinions, which would aid our evaluation of the approach and its 
consequences.
